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NOTE
THE ASSIMILATIVE CRIMES ACT
An understanding of the Assimilative Crimes Act is necessary for any
attorney who may one day find himself defending a client who has allegedly
committed a criminal offense in an area under federal jurisdiction. At first
blush, the lawyer may think that his client is clearly guilty and plan his
defense around the creation of a reasonable doubt in the court's or jury's
mind. However, in some instances, steps may be taken prior to a defense
on the merits which would raise serious doubts as to the legality of the
prosecution, and even if a conviction is forthcoming, objections might also
be validly raised against the severity of the punishment offered for the of-
fense. It is in this light that the functions and limitations of the ACA will
be examined to the end that Congress should adopt a comprehensive criminal
code to be applied uniformly to all areas under federal control.
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE AssIMILATIvE CRIMES ACr
The Assimilative Crimes Act of 19481 was the product of more than a
century of development. 2 In the early days of the Republic only a small
part of the nation was under federal jurisdiction. In those limited areas, the
commission of acts that were crimes at common law or by adjacent state
law became a problem of increasing magnitude because the Federal Criminal
Code was wholly ineffective in providing protection.3 In an effort to rem-
edy this problem, a congressional committee was assigned the task of
'The Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ACA] of
1948 provides:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved
or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or omission
which, although not made punishable by any enacment of Congress, would be
punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Terri-
tory, Possession, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof
in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and
subject to a like punishment.
2 The first ACA was enacted in 1825. Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 65, § 3, 4 Star. 115.
The statute was periodically reenacted. Act of April 5, 1866, ch. 24, § 2, 14 Stat. 13;
Act of July 7, 1898, ch. 576, § 2, 30 Stat. 717; Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 289, 35
Stat. 1145; Act of June 15, 1933, ch. 85, 48 Stat. 152; Act of June 20, 1935, ch. 284, 49
Star. 394; Act of June 6, 1940, ch. 241, 54 Stat. 234.
3 1 STORY, LirE OF SToRY 244 (1851). Justice Story was the author of the bill which
was the basis for the ACA of 1825. He said:
The criminal 'code of the United States is singularly defective and inefficient.
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establishing a criminal code for the federal enclaves throughout the United
States. The committee, however, rejected the concept of a uniform crim-
inal code and, instead, proposed legislation adopting for each enclave the
crimes punishable by the state in which the enclave was located.4 This
proposal established the basic policy of the ACA, to make the federal law
in each enclave conform as nearly as possible to the laws of the state in
which the enclave is located.a
The first ACA, the Act of 1825,6 was limited to the adoption of the state
law in force at the time of its enactment. As state legislatures made subse-
quent changes in their own law, the conformity that had once existed was
soon lost as the. ACA of 1825 had made no provision for any future addi-
dons or deletions in the state law. Thus Congress found it necessary to
Few, very few, of the practical crimes ... are now punishable by statutes,
and if the courts have no general common law jurisdiction ... they are wholly
dispunishable. The state courts have no jurisdiction of crimes committed on
the high seas, or in places ceded to the United States. Rapes, arsons, batteries,
and a host of other crimes may in these places be now committed-with impunity.
Suppose a conspiracy to commit treason in any of these places, by civil persons,
how can the crime be punished? These are cases where the United States have
an exclusive local jurisdiction. And can it be less fit that the Government should
have power to protect itself in all other places where it exercises a legitimate
authority? That Congress has power to provide for all crimes against the United
States is incontestible. Id. at 293.
4 1 GALES & SEToN, REGisTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS 338 (1825). Daniel Webster,
the sponsor of the bill in the Senate said:
[Ilt must be obvious, that, where the jurisdiction of a small place, containing
only a few hundreds of people ...was ceded to the United States, some pro-
vision was required for the punishment of offences; and as, from the use to which
the place was to be put, some crimes were likely to be more frequently com-
mitted than others, the committee had thought it sufficient to provide for these,
and then to leave the residue to be punished by the laws of the state in which the
yard ... might be. He was persuaded that the people would not view it as any
hardship, that the great class of minor offenses should continue to be punished
in the same manner as they had been before the cession. Id. at 338.
The purpose of the ACA is best summarized in United States v. Press Publishing
Co, 219 U.S. 1 (1911), wherein the Supreme Court said:
... [I]t becomes manifest that Congress, in adopting ... [the ACA], seduously
considered the twofold character of our constitutional government, and had
in view the enlightened purpose, so far as the punishment of crime was con-
cerned, to interfere as little as might be with the authority of the States on that
subject over all territory situated within their exterior boundaries, and which
hence would be subject to exclusive state jurisdiction but for the existence of
a United States reservation. Id. at 9.
The intention of Congress to maintain this desired conformity is evidenced by the
periodic'reenactments of the ACA from 1825 culminating in the 1948 statute which
to a certain degree has brought about simultaneous conformity of the federal law to
that of the states.
6 Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 65, S 3, 4 Star. 115.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [
re-enact comparable ACA's to pursue its goal of conformity with state law. 7
The ACA of 19338 made assimilation conditional upon the state law "re-
maining in force at the time of the doing or omitting the doing of such act
or thing. . . ." This act enabled Congress to maintain greater conformity
between the federal law and the state law by "reflecting future deletions
from the state laws as soon as made." 9
The ACA in its present form was enacted in 1948.10 This final version
of the ACA of 1825 provides for the assimilation of state laws "in force at
the time of" the alleged offense. Congress intended this revised statute to
make periodic re-enactments unnecessary in order to keep abreast of the
future changes in state law and thus further promote the policy of main-
taining conformity between the law of the federal enclave and the state
in which it lies."
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AssIMILATIvE CRIMES Acr
The ACA may be broadly classified as legislation by reference, a form of
lawmaking which has become increasingly popular among legislators. 12
Lawmakers have found the incorporation technique to be useful where
7 United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 291 (1958).
8 Act of June 15, 1933, ch. 85, 48 Stat. 152.
9 United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 292 (1958).
10 Note 1 supra.
11 United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1958).
12 Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference-A Statutory Jungle, 38 IowA L. REV. 705
(1953). Mr. Poldervaart provides an excellent discussion of this subject:
Legislators, cognizant of the constantly increasing volume of measures they are
turning out, and chronically pressed for time, are falling victim more and more
to the use of the treacherous expedient known as legislation by reference. While
in its broadest sense the term connotes almost every form of legislation in which
a reference is made to another statute, referential legislation of special legal sig-
nificance divides itself into three main types. These are: (1) amendatory statutes,
the most common form; (2) the statute later in point of time which adopts
provisions in part or in their entirety from other already existing laws without
republication; and (3) statutes which provide explicity or by implication for
incorporation within them not only all acts of a particular nature already passed
but also those which may be passed in the future, either by a subsequent legis-
lature of the same jurisdiction or by an agency of another state....
Use of the referential device has become increasingly popular with legislators
for several reasons. Constantly pressed by their constituents and their fellow
legislators for economies in legislation they have sought ways to reduce the bulk
of their proposed enactments as well as to cut down on the cost of publication.
Referential acts can be quickly drawn when time is short. Bare reference some-
times points up better than the completely incorporated act the portion of a
statute which is being amended. There is also the pithy, albeit somewhat legalistic
consideration that referential provisions bring precepts of proved merit, established
by court decision or usage and custom, into the new statute with a minimum of
legislative tinkering. Id. at 705-06.
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uniformity or conformity is the desired result.' 3 However, legislation by
reference is not without its evils which often tend to exceed its virtues.' 4
The question of constitutionality is one such evil which makes referential
legislation questionable in many situations and clearly invalid in others.15
There are three basic constitutional objections that might be raised against
referential legislation.' They are lack of due process, denial of equal pro-
tection, and the improper delegation of legislative authority. A question
of due process is raised because the referring statute does not explicitly set
forth the law to be incorporated. Instead, it requires a look beyond the
four corners of the statute to materials outside the referring body's juris-
diction, a procedure which often results in confusion and ambiguity over
what the law really is.'7 Equal protection may be denied as a result of pos-
sible discrimination, especially with regard to the ACA, as the federal law
would differ in the enclaves of the various states.' s A complete abdication
13 Hayes, Effect of Changes in Legislation Incorporated by Reference, 43 MINN. L.
Rxv. 89, 96 (1958).
14 See, Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference-A Statutory Jungle, 38 IowA L. REv.
705 (1953). The author mentions three of the most glaring evils:
(1) [tlhe difficulty of ascertaining just what it is that is being incorporated by
reference; (2) the opportunity it affords unscrupulous legislators and lobbyists to
secure enactment of legislation which otherwise would fail of passage; and (3)
the increased likelihood of improvident legislation enacted "without that intelligent
consideration and understanding of the matters involved which is so essential
to the procurement of wise and wholesome legislation." [quoting from Man-
chester Township Supervisors v. Wayne County Comm'r., 257 Pa. 442, 448, 101
A.736, 738 (1917).] Id. at 707.
15 Id. at 708.
' Hayes, Effect of Changes in Legislation Incorporated by Reference, 43 MINr. L.
Riv. 89, 100 (1958).
17 "The person who would know the law and avoid penalty must obtain the statutes
of another jurisdiction and read those, obtain the rules, read them, and then keep up on
all changes both in the statute and the rules" WA.KER, TaM LEisLATWE PRoCrss 344
(1948); Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference-A Statutory Jungle, 38 IowA L. Rxv. 705,
720-21 (1953). See also McCartin, The Constitutionality of the Federal Assimilative
Crimes Act, 17 FED. B. J. 157, 164 (1957).
Is See generally Hayes, Effect of Changes in Legislation Incorporated by Reference,
43 MINN. L. REv. 89, 102-03 (1958).
An argument which may primarily be directed toward the Assimilative Crimes
Act and some other federal referential legislation is that of discrimination. Mc-
Cartin [McCartin, The Constitutionality of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act,
17 Fed. B. J. 157, 165 (1957)] illustrates this with the example of a father, visiting
his soldier son stationed at an army post in State K, who while on the post sells
his car either to the son or to another soldier on Sunday. State K has a law
prohibiting Sunday sales, and this sale in federal territory may therefore be in
violation of the Assimilative Crimes Act. But were the army post in State 0,
which has no such Sunday law, no federal crime would be committed. It must
be noted that even though the father was from State N and unfamiliar with the
laws of either K or 0, if he made the sale outside the enclave and on adjoining
1972]
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of legislative power or even a delegation of this power to another which
lacks sufficient standards and control may result in an improper delegation
of legislative authority. 19
The Supreme Court found the ACA of 1948 which adopted prospective
state law to be constitutional in United States v. Sharpnack.20 The Court
considered the constitutional evils of incorporation by reference and dis-
missed them as non-existent in the ACA.21 The Sharpnack decision, how-
ever, does not seem to be based upon sound judicial logic, as the Court
appears to have been considerably influenced by the practicality and con-
land in state jurisdiction, he would have committed an offense in K but not in 0.
The objection, then, is not because of the father's lack of knowledge, and is not
primarily addressed to the in futuro aspect of the reference. Id. at 102.
19See Hayes, Effect of Changes in Legislation Incorporated by Reference, 43 MAxNt.
L. Rav. 89, 103 (1958); Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth While?, 25 MNtN. L.
RFV. 261, 283 (1941); Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Providing for Incorporation
of Other Laws, Rules, and Regulations in Futuro, 8 U. CiN. L. REv. 310 (1934); 27
VA. L. REv. 700 (1941).
20 355 U.S. 286 (1958). The constitutionality of the former ACAs which adopted
only the state law in existence and not the future changes in the state law was estab-
lished in Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910).
21Without citing any authorities in support of its position, the Court determined
that the ACA was not a violation of due process, asserting that "[wlhether Congress
sets forth the assimilated laws in full or assimilates them by reference, the result is as
definite and as ascertainable as are the state laws themselves." 355 U.S. 286, 293 (1958).
Nor was the ACA found to be an improper delegation by Congress of its legislative
powers to the States. The Court said:
[I]t is a deliberate continuing adoption by Congress for federal enclaves
of such unpre-empted offenses and punishments as shall have been already put
in effect by the respective States for their own government. Congress retains
power to exclude a particular state law from the assimilative effect of the Act.
This procedure is a practical accommodation of the mechanics of the legislative
functions of State and Nation in the field of police power where it is especially
appropriate to make the federal regulation of local conduct conform to that aL-
ready established by the State. Id. at 294.
Consequently, the Court held "[tihe application of the Assimilative Crimes Act to
subsequent adopted state legislation ... a reasonable exercise of congressional legislative
power and discretion." Id. at 297.
In touching upon the issue of equal protection, the Sharpnack Court indicated that
it is within Congress' power to enact a completed code for each enclave and it would
not be an unconstitutional discrimination if the various codes differed.
Although the dissenting Justices in Sharpnack concurred with the majority in find-
ing that Congress may incorporate some prospective legislation, they objected to the
incorporation as provided by the ACA claiming it to involve an inadequate determina-
tion of basic policy to guide the states. The dissenters said that the essence of lawmak-
ing requires that Congress determine this policy. Furthermore, they declared that under
the scheme approved by the majority, " ... a State makes such federal law, applicable
to the enclave, as it likes, and that law becomes federal law, for the violation of which
the citizen is sent to prison." Id. at 299.
[Vol. 7:116
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venience which the ACA presents and by a manifest congressional intent
to maintain conformity between state and federal law in the enclaves. 22 A
careful analysis of the constitutional issues raised by referential legislation
with respect to the ACA reveals a marked weakness in the Sharpnack de-
cision. First, the due process issue is extremely cogent since it would be
difficult to ascertain what is criminal under such an adoptive statute without
examining both the state and federal codes.23 However, it is a debatable
point and due deference should be given to the Court's opinion that cer-
tainty, clarity, and definiteness are present.24 Second, a denial of equal
protection may occur when persons committing the same act on a federal
enclave in different states results in one person being prosecuted for a crime
under an assimilated state law while the other person is not prosecuted be-
cause the state in which his enclave is located has no such lawA Neverthe-
less, it should be noted that the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2
allowed results in federal courts to vary according to the state law in diver-
sity cases. An analogy to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins would lend sup-
port to the Court's holding in Sharpnack, that it is within the power of
Congress to enact a complete code for each enclave and it would not be
unconstitutional discrimination if the various codes differed.27
The objection of primary concern is that the ACA, by incorporating
state law, may be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The
basis for this objection is found in such constitutional phrases as: "[alll
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States. . . ."2 and "[Congress is authorized] to make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the Foregoing
Powers .... , 29 Such phrases have generally been interpreted as adopting
the doctrine of separation of powers.30 However, it is difficult to define
22 Recognizing its underlying policy of 123 years' standing, Congress has thus at least
provided that within each federal enclave, to the extent that offenses are not
pre-empted by congressional enactments, there shall be complete current con-
formity with the criminal laws of the respective States in which the enclaves are
situated. Id. at 292-93.
23 See note 17 supra.
24355 U.S. 286, 293 (1958).
25 See note 18 supra.
26304 US. 64 (1938).
27 It should be noted that Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), dealt with
diversity in civil cases whereas the requirement of equal protection would be much
greater under criminal procedure.
28 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 1.
29.U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
3O See, e.g, A. ,L..A..Schechter Poultry',Corp. v. United-States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U.S. 149 (1920). See generally 16 Am. Jura. 2D CoNsrrru-noNAL LAW § 240-43 (1964).
Legal writers and philosophers have also interpreted such phrases in the Constitution
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precisely to what degree Congress may constitutionally delegate its legis-
lative power.
The very theory of the delegation of legislative power seems to prohibit
any type of delegation of congressional power to the states. Mr. Justice
McReynolds in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Steqvart3l said that "Congress
cannot transfer its legislative power to the States-by nature this is non-
delegable." 32 Further opposition to the delegation of congressional power
is found in two significant Supreme Court decisions in which federal statutes
delegating congressional power to the President were held to be uncon-
stitutional. 33
However, delegation of congressional power is not absolutely prohibited;
rather, it appears to be permissible if maintained within proper limits.34 If
a limited degree of delegation is permissible, where does this limit beyond
which "there is no constitutional authority to transcend" lie?38 United
States v. Grinaud36 indicates that such limits have not been precisely drawn.37
The basic test for determining where the limits lie requires that a court
"discover in the terms of the act a standard reasonably clear whereby
discretion must be governed." 38 If a court determines that Congress "has
declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule," 39
the delegation would clearly be improper. Thus the Supreme Court said in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States:
[W] e look to the statute to see whether Congress has overstepped these
limitations [of its authority to delegate] ,-whether Congress . . . has
itself established the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its
essential legislative function, or, by the failure to enact such standards
has attempted to'transfer that function to others.40
which provide for separation of powers to prohibit the delegations of legislative au-
thority. See LucE, LEGIsLATIvE PROBLEMS 4 (1935); 1 CooLEY, CONsrITUTnoNAL LIMITA-
TIONS 224 (8th ed. 1927).
31253 U.S. 149 (1920).
32 Id. at 164.
33 See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (both cases dealing with aspects of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act of 1933).
34 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
55 Id. at 430.
36 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
37 Id. at 517.
3 8 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 434 (1935) (Cardozo, J. dissenting).
"I concede [to the majority] that to uphold the delegation there is need to discover
in the terms of the act a standard reasonably clear whereby discretion must be gov-
erned."
39 Id. at 430.
40 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935).
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The Sharpnack Court concluded that because Congress retained power to
exclude a particular state law from the assimilative effect of the Act, there
was no improper delegation of congressional legislative power violating
constitutional requirements.
The objection to the delegation of congressional power under the ACA
of 1948 is aggravated because of the Act's provision for the adoption of
prospective state law. Legal writers are in dispute over the constitutionality
of the incorporation of in futuro legislation.41 Two lower federal courts
prior to Sharpnack took the position that the adoption of future legislation
constituted an improper delegation and abdication of legislative duties.42
However, these decisions were dicta and must be inferentially taken as over-
ruled by Sharpnack.
There are certain practical reasons for upholding the validity of the
ACA,43 but practical expediences should never justify the abridgement of
constitutional limitations. The ACA should have been found unconstitu-
tional by the Sharpnack Court. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan44 is directly
on point. In that case, the Supreme Court found a federal act which per-
mitted the President to prohibit interstate transportation of oil unconsti-
tutional. The Court asserted that the statute:
[G]oes beyond those limits.... [T]he Congress has declared no pol-
icy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no
41 Both Cooley and McCartin believe that the incorporation of prospective laws is
unconstitutional. See 1 CooLEY, CoNsTITroTIOAL LiMrrATIoNs 224 (8th ed. 1927) Mc-
Cartin, The Constitutionality of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 17 FmD. B. J. 157
(1957). The contrary position has been taken in Note, The Constitutionality of Laws
Providing for Incorporation of Other Laws, Rules, and Regulations in Futuro, 8 U. CIN.
L. REv. 310 (1934).
A number of state courts would uphold such legislation in many instances. See, e.g.,
Brock v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 291, 299, 71 P.2d 209, 213 (1937); State v. Urquhart,
50 Wash.2d 131, 310 P.2d 261 (1957).
42 Hollister v. United States, 145 Fed. 773, 779 (8th Cir. 1906) (dictum); United
States v. Barnaby, 51 Fed.20, 23 (D. Mont. 1893) (dictum).
43 Note, The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 HAtav. L. REv. 685 (1957).
The argument that only Congress has the requisite capacity to enact criminal
law for the enclave does not seem justifiable, since the state legislature which is
acting in its stead is -itself an elected legislature with a similar responsibility for
enacting wise criminal laws. Further, since the state laws adopted by the ACA
deal with conduct which presents substantially identical problems in an enclave
and in the state in which it is situated, the state legislature would seem equally
competent to formulate law for both. And since Congress chose to achieve a
partial identity in the laws of the enclave and the surrounding territory, the
present method would seem to be an exercise and not an abdication of congres-
sional responsibility. Id. at 689.
44 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which
the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.45 -
Similarly, the ACA presents an inadequate determination of policy for state
guidance. Congress has given the states a mandate to enact laws that per-
sons on federal enclaves "shall not offend." Justice Douglas, dissenting in
Sharpnack, would require that the basic policy at least establish the act which
is not to be offended-"thou shall not speed." 46 Therefore, just as the fed-
eral act in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, which permitted Congress to say
thou shall not commit any act in interstate commerce which the President
prohibits, was held unconstitutional, so should the congressional mandate
to the states, which provides that thou shall not commit those criminal
offenses which the state prohibits, also be held unconstitutional. Merely
because Congress retains the authority to exclude any state law from as-
similation does not make its delegation to the states proper and within per-
missive limits. If such were the case, practically any type of delegation by
Congress of its power to another would be valid.
III. CRIMINAL OFFENSES UNDER THE ASSIMILATIVE CRIMES AcT
Before discussing criminal offenses in conjunction with the ACA, it is
necessary to consider the jurisdiction of the Act. The ACA provides that
it is applicable in the "places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired
as provided in section 7 of this title." 47 However, only subsection 3 of
section 748 appears to be applicable to the ACA as section 7 defines the total
territorial and special maritime jurisdiction of the United States, whereas the
words "places.. .. reserved or acquired" connotes the ownership of land by
the United States as provided for under subsection 3 of section 7.49
45Id. at 430.
46 Hayes, Effect of Changes in Legislation Incorporated by Reference, 43 MiNi. L.
REv. 89 (1958). Hayes, in a perceptive interpretation of the majority's holding in
Sharpnack, says:
The majority opinion, by its terms applies only to the incorporation in the
Assimilative Crimes Act of subsequently adopted state legislation, and holds that
action, under the limitations prescribed by the Court, to be "a reasonable exer-
cise of congressional legislative power and discrimination." [355 U.S. at 297]
But the limitations apparently prescribed, at most, are that Congress act under
the federal police power, that it reasonably decide in its discretion whether to
incorporate prospective legislation, and that it retain power to change the law if
displeased by any subsequent state legislation that would otherwise have been
automatically incorporated. Id. at 95.47 Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (1969).
48 18 U.S.C.A. § 7 (1969).
49 H. R. REP. No. 1584, 76th Cong., 3d Seas. I (1940); S. REP. No. 1699, 76th Cong,
3d Sess. I (1940). 18 U.S.C.A. § 7 (1969) provides that "The term 'special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,' as used in this title includes:"
[Vol. 7-116
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A state criminal offense is not made federal law by the ACA if the offense
known to the state has been defined and prohibited by the Federal Criminal
Code5  Similarly, if the congressional definition of an offense is more nar-
row than that provided for it by the state, it does not mean that the con-
gressional definition is superseded by the state's.51 Likewise, in situations
where the congressional definition conflicts with that of the, state, the state
definition is not permitted to give a more narrow scope to the offense than
that provided for it by Congress.5 2 However, one federal court has held
that "where the state statute provides a theory essentially different from
that provided in the federal statute, the government can proceed on either
(1) The high seas and any other waters which are within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States and outside the jurisdiction'of any particular State.
(2) Any vessel registered under the laws of the United States and operating on the
waters of the Great Lakes or any waters connecting them.
(3) "Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise ac-
quired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the
same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful
building."
(4) Any islhand containing guano.
(5) Any aircraft which is in flight over any waters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States but outside the jurisdiction of any particular State.
However, there has been at least one case in which the ACA was extended to S 7(2).
The defendant was convicted of an assault with intent to commit the felony, sodomy,
aboard a boat licensed under the laws of the United States on Lake Michigan. United
States v. Gill, 204 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 825 (1953).The areas under § 7 (5) are extensive. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 327 U.S.
711 (1946) (Indian reservations); James' Stewart 'and Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.& 94
(1940) (post offices); Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938) (na-
tional parks); United' States v.-Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930) (military reservations and
forts); Capetola v. Barclay White Co, 139 F.2d 556 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 799 (1944) (naval yards); United States v. Heard, 270 F. Supp. 198 (WiD. Mo.
1967) (land used as Jobs Corps Center); Air Terminal Services, Inc. v. Rentzel, 81 F.
Supp. 611 (E. D. Va. 1949) (airports).
For a thorough discussion of jurisdiction under the ACA and the possible existence
of concurrent jurisdiction of the federal government with the states, see Note, The
Federal Asshilative Crines Act, 70 HAv. L. Rnv. 685, 685-88 (1957).50 Assinrdlative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (1969): "Whoever . . . is guilty of
any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Con-
gress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State
shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment." The Congress
in 1947 indicated that the ACA of 1948 was to be interpreted the same as the 1940 act
which provided that a crime is assimilated which is not made penal by any laws 6f
Congress, Act of June 6, 1940, ch. 241, 54 Stat. 234. H. R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong,
Ist.:Sess. A8 (1947).
.Al See Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 686, 711 (1946).
G2Id.
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statute." 13 Thus when the state statute fits the facts of the case more pre-
cisely, it is not improper for the government to proceed under it.54 There-
fore, if both the state and Congress have established similar offenses, whether
or not the state offense is assimilated depends on whether the requisite
ingredients of the one offense are the same as the other. 55
A problem would seem to exist where the state provides for a crime of
lesser degree than that provided for by Congress. For example, the Federal
Criminal Code provides for certain consummated crimes but makes no pro-
visions for the corresponding attempts.50 It would seem doubtful that Con-
gress intended to punish the completed offense yet condone an unsuccessful
attempt of a serious crime. Therefore, the state law making the attempted
offense a crime should be assimilated.57
The ACA assimilates both the state offense and its punishment. How-
ever, the punishment of an offense under the ACA cannot be greater than
that provided for by federal law.58 Therefore, if the completed crime is
punished more severely by the state law than the federal law, then both
the state punishment for the attempted and completed offenses should be
adjudged too harsh and the federal punishment for the attempt should be
proportioned downward accordingly. That is, the punishment for the
attempted crime under federal law would be proportioned to the federal
punishment for the consummated offense as the punishment for the at-
Zs Fields v. United States, 438 F.2d 205, 207 (2d. Cir. 1970).
54 Id. at 208.
55 See Dunaway v. United States, 170 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1948). The defendant was
being tried for two offenses, burglary and larceny. The defendant intended that the
state crime of burglary should not be incorporated by the ACA as the burglary of-
fense is "comprehended and made penal by the federal larceny statute." Id. at 12. The
federal court said:
The federal larceny statute penalizes only the taking and carrying away, with
intent to steal, any personal property of another. The crime of burglary is com-
plete with the act of breaking and entering the building with intent to steal
although the intended theft may be frustrated or abandoned. The taking and
carrying away of the goods of another are essential elements of the offense of
larceny, while the breaking and entering of a building in the nighttime are not
requisite ingredients of such offense .... Thus, burglary and larceny are two
separate and distinct offenses and a conviction may be had for both although
committed in the same transaction. Id. at 12.
66The federal crimes of larceny (18 U.S.C.A. S 661 (1966)) and robbery (18 U.S.C.A.
S 211 (1970)) as set out in the Federal Criminal Code do not appear to include attempts,
but only the completed offenses.
5 7 Note, The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 H~av. L. REv. 684, 692 (1957).
58 See Dunaway v. United States, 170 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1948). Assimilated crimes
which are punished as felonies under state law are made felonies under federal law.
See United States v. Coppersmith, 4 F. 198 (W. D. Tenn. 1880).
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tempted state offense is proportionate to the punishment for the completed
state offense.59
Certain problems, related to but not directly concerned with the adoption
of state criminal law, may arise under the ACA. Although the state defini-
tion of an assimilated crime governs in a federal court, the procedure of
prosecution remains a federal prerogative, 0 However, certain matters are
not capable of being defined as either substantive or procedural. One such
matter is the statute of limitations for a criminal offense. The question of
the application of the statute of limitations has arisen in at least one federal
case where it was held that since the time within which prosecution must
be brought is not an element of the offense, the application of the federal
statute of limitations must control.61 Another matter which is not directly
related to the adoption of state criminal laws concerns the problem of double
jeopardy. The possibility of double jeopardy may arise when either the
federal and state governments have concurrent jurisdiction over the enclave,
or when the defendant's criminal act has contacts with both the state and
federal jurisdictions.6 2
IV. LIMITAIONS OF THE ASSIMILATIVE CRIMES AcT
The limitation placed on the assimilation of state law by the ACA should
be broader than merely prohibiting the assimilation of state law where an
equivalent federal law already exists. In addition, the ACA should not be
construed to asssimilate state law which either conflicts with congressional
policy or regulations issued pursuant to statutory authority.6 3 Furthermore,
G9For example, if completed crime X is punished by 5 years imprisonment under a
federal statute, but the same offense is punished by 10 years imprisonment by state
law, then if the punishment for attempted crime X by state law is 8 years, its punish-
ment under federal law should therefore be set at 4 years. See generally Note, The
Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 HNAv. L. REv. 685, 691-93 (1957).
0 See McCoy v. Pescor, 145 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 868 (1945)
(sufficiency of indictment determined by federal law).
61 United States v. Andem, 158 F. 996 (D. NJ. 1908).
62 Note, The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 HAtv. L. Rev. 685, 697 (1957). Before
an issue of double jeopardy can arise, the defendant must be brought to trial a second
time with the offense being charged at the second trial growing out of the same evi-
dence on which the charge was based in the first trial. United States v. Cooper, 143
F. Supp. 76, 78 (N.D. Cal. 1956). United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) upheld
as constitutional a double prosecution udder the Natiohal Prohibition" Act becaus the
single act was an offense against both state and federal sovereignties. However, United
States v. Mason, 213 U.S. 115 (1909) may qualify Cooper. In that case, the Court held
that a criminal statute which adopted state law like the ACA was intended to allow the
federal government to prosecute a defendant only if he had not yet been tried in the
state court and was thus constitutional.
63 Note, The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 HAtv. L. Rev. 685, 694 (1957).
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the ACA should not assimilate state criminal laws which would interfere with
activities in conjunction with the intended purpose of the federal enclave. 64
It should also be construed that Congress did not desire to adopt state crim-
inal laws which were purely regulatory, such as laws connected with health,
game laws, and building codes.65
Although Congress intended to fill the gaps in the Federal Criminal Code
by adopting state law through the ACA,66 some gaps still remain. A major
reason for this failure is that state legislatures have also adopted the use of
referential legislation. The state statutes employing legislation by refer-
ence fall into two categories. First, there are the laws which provide for
the regulation of certain broad types of conduct, leaving the details to be
filled in by the local governments of the state. A second category provides
for state administrative bodies to establish certain regulations governing
conduct specified by the state legislature. A simple example of the first
classification is a state statute which authorizes local governments to enact
parking regulations, the violation of which is a crime. 67 An example of the
second type can be found in a directive by the state legislature that the
State Highway Commission may designate and provide for highway and
road sign markings and that the failure of a driver to comply with these
official markings is a crime.68 In a case arising under either of these situa-
tions, the court is faced with a problem of double delegation of a congres-
sional authority; that is, Congress to the state and then the state to the
local government or administrative body. In the first instance, where the
state has made a delegation to the local government, the federal enclave
should completely lack any federal law touching upon the conduct which
64 Id.
65 Id. at 695.
66 Air Terminal Services, Inc. v. Rentzel, 81 F. Supp. 611, 612 (E.D. Va. 1949).
67 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-252 (1972). The text of the statute is as follows:
The council or other governing body of any city or town may, by a general
ordinance, provide for the regulation of parking within its limits . . . and may
delegate to the appropriate administrative official or officials the authority to make
and enforce such additional rules and regulations as parking conditions may
require and may prescribe penalties for failure to conform thereto.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld this delegation to
the municipality as a reasonable exercise of its police power. Leesburg v. Tavenner,
196 Va. 80, 82 S.E.2d 597 (1954).
68See, e.g., VA. CoDE ANN. S 46.1-173 (1972). The text of the statute is as follows:
The State Highway Commission may classify, designate and mark State highways
and provide a uniform systen of markings and signing such highways undek the
jurisdiction of this State .... The driver of a motor vehicle .. . shall obey and
comply with the requirements of road signs erected upon the -authority of the
State Highway Commission . . . and the failure of such driver'to obey such signs
or comply with this provision shall constitute a misdemeanor and upon convic-
tion shall be punished ......
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the state allowed the local government to control.'9 As to the state dele-
gation to administrative bodies, it is questionable whether mere conformity
by the federal enclave to the administrative regulations would be sufficient
to bring the enclave under the protection of the state law by its assimila-
tion into the Federal Code.70
V. CONCLUSION
Congress has both the authority and the duty to provide an effective,
efficient, and just code of criminal law for the areas under federal jurisdic-
tion. The enactment of the ACA has been an effort by Congress to meet
this duty. However, the ACA is singularly ineffective, inefficient, and unjust.
The basic policy of Congress to provide conformity between state and
federal law does not warrant the sacrifices which must be made. Congress
should resolve itself to the task of adopting a comprehensive criminal code
to be applied uniformly to all areas under federal jurisdiction. Until that
time, a more perfect justice may only be obtained by a diligent consider-
ation of the constitutional and procedural limitations of the ACA in the
courts themselves.
I.H. M.
609 The simple reason for this is that there is no state law to assimilate. The only
law covering the offensive conduct lies within the local ordinances. No provision is
made in the ACA for the adoption of local ordinances in the area in which the federal
enclave is located.
70 The Virginia statute expressly says that the road signs must be "erected upon the
authority of the State Highway Commission." VA. CoDn AN. § 46.1-173 (1972). Mere
conformance by the federal enclave to the markings erected by the State Highway
Commission throughout the State would not be a compliance with the state statute
which specifically requires authorization from the State Highway Commission to erect
such signs. However, even if the State Highway Commission came onto the federal
enclave and authorized the erection of signs, this would still fail to make the statute
applicable to the enclave as the Commission would then be acting outside of the juris-
dictional authority provided it by the State.
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